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Abstract In this paper we study the theory Q. We prove a
basic result that says that, in a sense explained in the paper,
Q can be split into two parts. We prove some consequences
of this result. (i) Q is not a poly-pair theory. This means
that, in a strong sense, pairing cannot be defined in Q. (ii)
Q does not have the Pudlák Property. This means that there
two interpretations of S12 in Q which do not have a definably
isomorphic cut. (iii) Q is not sententially equivalent with
PA−. This tells us that we cannot do much better than mutual
faithful interpretability as a measure of sameness of Q and
PA−. We briefly consider the idea of characterizing Q as the
minimal-in-some-sense theory of some kind modulo some
equivalence relation. We show that at least one possible road
towards this aim is closed.
Keywords Q · PA− · Arithmetic · Weak theories ·
Interpretability · comparison of theories
1 Prelude
Robinson’s Arithmetic Q is an old friend. The first time I
met it was when I studied the First Incompleteness Theo-
rem in Boolos and Jeffrey’s wonderful book Computability
Communicated by A. Di Nola, D. Mundici, C. Toffalori, A. Ursini.
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Franco Montagna. Franco
was a gentle colleague and a fine human being. His insights and ideas
were always an inspiration.
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and Logic.1 The choice of Q and its smaller brother R to
prove the First Incompleteness Theorem is beautiful, since
these theories seem to be about as weak as one can get to
prove this result.2 On the other hand, it is a bit awkward to
go on from there to prove the Second Incompleteness Theo-
rem, where we need internal verification of some principles.
Computability and Logic also contains nice exercises illus-
trating how easy it is to manufacture various counter-models
to show non-provability in Q.
Later Iwas pleased to discover that there are—in a sense—
two proofs of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for Q
itself. There is a truly beautiful result byBezboruah andShep-
herdson (1976). They show that, under some very reasonable
assumptions, the theory PA− does not prove the consistency
of any theory. Hence, a fortiori,Q does not prove its own con-
sistency. Bezboruah and Shepherdson’s proof does depend
on rather specific assumptions about the coding. Also it does
not generalize to stronger theories. What is more, it tells us
nothing about the question whether Q can prove its consis-
tency on some definable cut. Later, Pavel Pudlák proved a
1 Caveat Emptor. The version ofComputability and Logic I studiedwas
the second edition. In this book,Q is introduced with the correct axioms
but without the name ‘Robinson’s Arithmetic’ and without reference to
Tarski et al. (1953). The fourth edition (Boolos et al. 2002) is by Boolos,
Burgess and Jeffrey. In this book, a different (but closely related) theory,
also called minimal arithmetic, is presented asQ. In an optional section,
we learn that “the label Q is often used to refer not to our minimal
arithmetic but to another system, calledRobinson’s Arithmetic forwhich
we use the label R”. Then, the correct axioms for our Q are specified.
However, now the name R is used for Q and not for Tarski, Mostowski
and Robinson’s R …
2 Saul Kripke noted that one can even prove the First Incompleteness
Theorem for weaker theories than R, to wit a theory he calls school.
His proof uses Matiyasevich’s Theorem to compensate the fact that for
school one cannot proveΣ1-completeness, employing the fact that one
still has completeness for purely existential formulas.
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strong version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem (see
Pudlák 1985; Hájek and Pudlák 1993) that I would formulate
as follows. Let U be any consistent recursively enumerable
theory and let N be an interpretation of Q in U . Then, U
does not prove its own consistency relativized to N . It seems
to me that one should say that Bezboruah and Shepherdson
on the one hand and Pudlák on the other proved quite differ-
ent results which share some consequences. I always thought
that the two proofs should provide a good case study for a
philosophical enquiry into the problem of theorem individu-
ation.
Still later I readTarski et al. (1953)which proves the essen-
tial undecidability ofQ. And after that there was also Nelson
(1986)where the possibilities for bootstrapping inQ are used
with impressive, almost magical, results.
The present paper is my tribute to Q. As is fitting among
friends, I will not only praise it, but also discuss, in a respect-
ful way, some of its weaknesses.
2 Introduction
The theory Q was introduced by Robinson (1950). He intro-
duced it as a simplification of an earlier finitely axiomatized,
essentially undecidable theory due to Mostowski and Tarski
(1949). The system became widely known via the book
Undecidable Theories by Tarski et al. (1953). It is given by
the following axioms:
Q1.  Sx = Sy → x = y
Q2.  Sx = 0
Q3.  x = 0 ∨ ∃y x = Sy
Q4.  x + 0 = x
Q5.  x + Sy = S(x + y)
Q6.  x · 0 = 0
Q7.  x · Sy = x · y + x
Robinson shows that Q is essentially undecidable, which
tells us that any consistent theory that interprets Q is unde-
cidable. Since Q is finitely axiomatized, it follows that any
theory that weakly interprets Q,3 i.o.w. any theory that is
consistent with some translation of Q, is undecidable.
The theory Q is, in many senses, a natural theory. What
would be the quintessential weak arithmetic? Well, we want
to have at least the basic properties of zero and the successor
function: zero is not a successor and the successor relation
is total, functional and injective. Then, we want the recur-
sion equations for addition and multiplication. However, the
resulting theory is a subtheory of the theory of the positive
3 The notion of weak interpretability is introduced by Tarski,
Mostowski and Robinson. Giorgi Japaridze uses tolerates for weakly
interprets, which seems to me a more descriptive term.
reals including zero. Thus, it has a decidable extension. So,
the theory cannot binumerate the recursive functions.We can
repair that by adding the axiom that zero and successor are
jointly surjective. This final axiom seems to have a certain
harmony with the other successor axioms: we have axioms
Q1 andQ2 to state that zero and successor are jointly injective
andwe have an axiom, to witQ3, that articulates that they are
jointly surjective. Thus, from the standpoint of motivation of
the axioms, Q seems to be a well-balanced theory.
Clearly,Q is very weak. However, if we are just interested
in the property of essential undecidability, we can go much
weaker. There is the theoryR, also introduced in Tarski et al.
(1953). Here are the axioms of R, where underlining stands
for the usual unary numeral function.
R1.  m + n = m + n
R2.  m · n = m · n
R3.  m = n, for m = n
R4.  x ≤ n → ∨i≤n x = i
R5.  x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x
This theory is not only essentially undecidable but also has
the property that any theory that weakly interprets it is unde-
cidable. See Vaught (1962). Since we build up the needed
machinery anyway, we will provide a proof of this last result
in Sect. 3.
We can even consider weaker theories thanR. See Vaught
(1962) and Jones and Shepherdson (1983). See also Visser
(2014) for more information.
The theory R is not finitely axiomatizable. Moreover,
everyfinitely axiomatized subtheory of it is finitely satisfiable
and, hence, has a decidable extension. So perhaps Q is the
weakest finitely axiomatized theory that is essentially unde-
cidable and, say, extendsR? Alas, no such luck. We refer the
reader to Víteˇzslav Švejdar’s paper in Švejdar (2007) where
finitely axiomatized systems are studied that are weaker than
Q. These systems do not extendR but with aminor modifica-
tion they do: we have to set the partial functions in Švejdar’s
paper when they are not defined to some default value.
The systems studied by Švejdar are mutually interpretable
with Q, so perhaps Q is still minimal, among finitely axiom-
atized theories, with respect to interpretability? Not so, for
any finitely axiomatized subtheory A ofQ that extendsR, we
can find a finitely axiomatized subtheory B of A that extends
R and such that B does not interpret A. This can be shown by
a minor adaptation of the methods of Friedman (2007). We
show how to do this in Sect. 3. So, the prospect of charac-
terizing Q, or some closely related theory, as the weakest (in
a suitable sense) finitely axiomatized theory with such and
such a property, seems pretty dim.
A quite different and beautiful feature of Q is that it inter-
prets fairly strong theories like IΔ0 +Ω1 on a definable cut.
It follows from this that we have the second incompleteness
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theorem for all extensions of Q. This feature also holds for
the still weaker theories studied by Švejdar that interpret Q
on a definable cut. Regrettably, this does not seem to help us
with the characterization problem.
From one perspective, Q seems rather natural, from
another it does not. It lacks many desirable properties. As
has been shown in Visser (2008) and Jerˇábek (2012), Q is
not a pair theory. In Sect. 5 of this paper we will show that it
is not even a poly-pair theory. We will also show, in Sect. 6,
that Q does not have the Pudlák property. The negation of
the Pudlák property for Q tells us that there are two inter-
pretations of S12 in Q that do not verifiably have definably
isomorphic cuts.
It is interesting to compareQwith its bigger brotherPA−.
The theory PA− is the theory of commutative, discretely
ordered semi-rings with a minimal element plus the sub-
traction axiom (PA−14 below). It is employed as the basic
arithmetic, e.g. in the textbook (Kaye 1991). The theory is
given by the following axioms:
PA−1.  x + 0 = x
PA−2.  x + y = y + x
PA−3.  (x + y) + z = x + (y + z)
PA−4.  x · 1 = x
PA−5.  x · y = y · x
PA−6.  (x · y) · z = x · (y · z)
PA−7.  x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z
PA−8.  x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x
PA−9.  (x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z) → x ≤ z
PA−10.  x + 1  x
PA−11.  x ≤ y → (x = y ∨ x + 1 ≤ y)
PA−12.  x ≤ y → x + z ≤ y + z
PA−13.  x ≤ y → x · z ≤ y · z
PA−14.  x ≤ y → ∃z x + z = y
Emil Jerˇábek’s version in Jerˇábek (2012) does not have the
subtraction axiom PA−14. Thus Jerˇábek’s version is a uni-
versal theory. As noted by Jerˇábek his version interprets the
stronger version with subtraction axiom on a definable cut.
The weak version does not extend Q but the strong version
does.
The theory PA− has been shown to be sequential by Emil
Jerˇábek in his paper (Jerˇábek 2012) (even in the weaker form
without the subtraction axiom).
Bezboruah and Shepherdson (1976) show that, under
some very reasonable assumptions, PA− does not prove the
consistency of any theory.
Victor Pambuccian studies number theoretical theorems
over PA−. See his papers (Pambuccian 2008, 2014, 2015).
The theoryQ interprets much stronger theories thanPA−,
like IΔ0 + Ω1 (see, e.g. Hájek and Pudlák 1993). Hence, a
fortiori,Q ismutually interpretablewithPA− (both the strong
and theweakversion).Using ideas ofPerLindström, onemay
show that Q is even mutually faithfully interpretable with
PA−. One can also demonstrate that the Lindenbaum alge-
bras of Q and PA− are recursively isomorphic. This means
that there is a recursive function of sentences that induces an
isomorphism of Lindenbaum algebras. The result is a special
case of the theorem of Marian Pour-El and Saul Kripke that
the Lindenbaum algebras of all recursively enumerable theo-
ries that interpret Q are recursively isomorphic. See Pour-El
and Kripke (1967).
Are these the best samenesses that we can get between
these theories? In Sect. 7, we will show that the two theories
are not sententially congruent. So, at least in terms of tradi-
tional notions of sameness,we cannot do better than recursive
isomorphism of Lindenbaum algebras on the one hand, and
mutual faithful interpretability on the other.
The main technical tool of the paper is a theorem that tells
us that, in a sense, Q can be split into two disjoint parts. This
result is proved in Sect. 4. The proof is an adaptation of an
earlier result inVisser (2014).Onemight say that the progress
of the present paper is to provide a better understanding of
what the result of Visser (2014) really means.
We end the paperwith some concluding remarks in Sect. 8.
2.1 How to read the paper
In the appendices, I present basic materials needed for under-
standing the paper. In the main text there are references to
the appendices when needed. Section 3 can be read indepen-
dently of the other sections. Section 4 is the basic preliminary
for Sects. 5–7. The Sects. 5–7 are pairwise independent of
each other.
3 Between R and Q
In this section, we endeavour to make the idea of characteriz-
ing Q using an appropriate minimality claim less plausible.
Perhaps it is better to say: if there is a characterization of Q
as the minimal theory such that …, then it cannot take such
and such a form. Specifically, we show that, for any finitely
axiomatised consistent theory A such that R ⊆ A, there is a
finitely axiomatised B such that R ⊆ B ⊆ A and B  A.4
The result is just a rather direct application of ideas from
Friedman (2007). So, we do not claim great originality here.
The following nice version of the theory of a number was
developed by JohannesMarti, Nal Kalchbrenner, Paula Henk
and Peter Fritz in Interpretability Project Report of 2011, the
report of a project they did under my guidance in the Master
4 The notation ⊆ holds between theories of the same signature. It is
the extensional subset relation between the sets of theorems of the the-
ories at hand. The notation  is explained in the “Global and local
interpretability” section of Appendix 1.
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of Logic in Amsterdam.5,6 We call it the theory of a number
since, in our intended applications, the fact that it is satisfied
by the structure associated with a finite, non-zero ordinal is
central.
TN1.  x < 0
TN2.  (x < y ∧ y < z) → x < z
TN3.  x < y ∨ x = y ∨ y < x
TN4.  x = 0 ∨ ∃y x = Sy
TN5.  Sx < x
TN6.  x < y → (x < Sx ∧ y < Sx)
TN7.  x + 0 = 0
TN8.  x + Sy = S(x + y)
TN9.  x · 0 = 0
TN10.  x · Sy = x · y + x
Since TN6 implies x < x , a model of TN is a linear
ordering that either represents a finite ordinal or starts with a
copy of ω.
We call a Δ0-formula pure if (i) all bounding terms are
variables and (ii) all occurrences of terms are in subformulas
of the form Sx = y, x + y = z and x · y = z. We call a
Σ1-sentence pure if it is of the form ∃x S0x, where S0 is a
pure Δ0-sentence.
We can transform an arbritrary Σ1-sentence S into a pure
Σ1-sentence S◦, for example, in the following way. We start
with S. We treat bounded quantifiers for the moment as if
they were given with the language and not defined. First we
replace all implications (A → B) by (¬A ∨ B) and all bi-
implications by ((¬A ∨ B) ∧ (¬B ∨ A)). Next we push all
negations inside in the usual manner. We replace:
– ∀x < t by ∃z (t = z ∧ ∀x < z . . .),
– ∃x < t by ∃z (t = z ∧ ∃x < z . . .),
– ¬t0 = t1 by ∃z∃w (t0 = z ∧ t1 = w ∧ ¬z = w),
– ¬t0 < t1 by ∃z∃w (t0 = z ∧ t1 = w ∧ ¬z < w).
In this way all term occurrences are on positive places. At
this point we apply the usual term-unwinding algorithm to
our formula using a small scope interpretation. We note that
this will translate an atomic formula to a block of exis-
tential quantifiers followed by an boolean combination of
atomic formulas. Finally, we bring all unbounded existen-
tial quantifiers to the front in the usual manner replacing,
e.g. ∀x < y∃z . . . by ∃w∀x < y∃z < w . . .. The resulting
5 Unfortunately, the report is not available. We reproduce all necessary
materials here.
6 I simplified the axioms of Marti, Kalchbrenner, Henk and Fritz a
bit and also implemented three nice simplifications suggested by the
referee. It seems to me that, for our intended applications, we could
evenworkwith theweaker system that omits axiomTN4. The remaining
system would also be satisfied by an arbitrary ordinal.
formula is S◦, which is clearly pure and equivalent to the
original formula (say, over PA− plus Σ1-collection).7
We note that the transformation S → S◦ that we described
is clearly elementary. Hence it exists in EA. Inspecting the
transformation, we see that S◦ implies S in predicate logic.
Let S := ∃yS0y, where S0 is a pure Δ0-formula. We
define:
[S] := TN + ∃x∃y < x S0y.
Using the machinery of theories of a number, we can
reproveCobham’s result that any recursively enumerable the-
ory that weakly interprets R is undecidable. Suppose U is
recursively enumerable and U + Rτ is consistent. Consider
a pure Σ1-sentence S. Let S be the sentence that says:
∃x (Sx | [S] ∧ ∀y < xSy | [S]).
Since [S] is finitely axiomatised, we can write out S in the
obvious way. Consider the set S of all S such that U + (R+
S)τ is consistent. Clearly, S contains all true (pure) Σ1-
sentences. If S did not contain false (pure) Σ1-sentences,
then this would make Σ1-truth decidable. Hence, there is
a false (pure) Σ1-sentence S1 such that U + (R + S1)τ is
consistent. We can use S1 to build a translation τ0 such that
U + [S1]τ0 is consistent. Since [S1] is a finitely axiomatised
extension of R, it follows that U is undecidable.
To prove our main result we need the following result
that was first verified in detail in the Interpretability Project
Report by Marti, Kalchbrenner, Henk and Fritz. The basic
idea behind the result is present in Friedman’s (2007).
We remind the reader of witness comparison notation.
Suppose A is of the form ∃x A0(x) and B is of the form
∃y B(y). We define:
– A < B := ∃x(A(x) ∧ ∀y ≤ x¬B(y)).
– A ≤ B := ∃x(A(x) ∧ ∀y < x¬B(y)).
– If C is A < B, then C⊥ is B ≤ A.
– If D is A ≤ B, then D⊥ is B < A.
Theorem 1 Let S and S′ be pure Σ1-sentences. We have:
(a) Suppose S is true. Then, if we allow piecewise interpre-
tations, we have   [S].
If we do not allow piecewise interpretations, we still have
(∃x∃yx = y)  [S].
(b) If S ≤ S′, then [S′]  S.
7 The referee remarks that the use of Σ1-collection can be eliminated
from the argument. To do this one needs a careful expansion and rework-
ing of the current argument.
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Proof Ad (a): We note that if S is true, then [S] has a finite
model. Any theory with a finite model is interpretable with a
piecewise interpretation in predicate logic. If we do not allow
piecewise interpretations,we can obtain the same effect using
a multidimensional interpretation, assuming that we have at
least two distinct elements.
Ad (b). Consider any model M of [S′]. Without loss of
generality we can identify the initial elements of M with
0, 1, 2, . . . It is easily shown that for any pureΔ0-formula Ax
we have An is true iff M | An, provided the n are natural
numbers in M and are not the top elements.8 Suppose m is
the smallest witness of S. Then we have M | ¬S′0k, for
all k < m. Since S′ is witnessed by a non-top element, m is
non-top and we have M | S0m, and hence M | S. unionsq
We now have the materials to prove the main theorem of
the present section.
Theorem 2 Suppose R ⊆ A, where A is finitely axiomatized
and consistent. Then, there is a finitely axiomatized B such
that R ⊆ B ⊆ A and B  A.
Proof Suppose R ⊆ A, where A is finitely axiomatized and
consistent. By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we define R
with:
EA  R ↔ ([R◦]  A) ≤ (A  [R◦]) .
Suppose [R◦]  A. It follows that either R or R⊥.
In the first case, we find R◦. By Theorem 1(a), we find that
 [R◦] and, hence, that A. Quod non, since A extends
R and since any theory interpretable in predicate logic has
finite models.
In the second case, it follows that (R⊥)◦ and¬R◦. Hence,
(R⊥)◦ ≤ R◦ and, hence, by Theorem 1(b), [R◦]  (R⊥)◦.
Since R◦ implies R in predicate logic and similarly for (R⊥)◦
and R⊥, we find that [R◦] proves both R and R⊥. So, [R◦] 
⊥. From R⊥, we also have A  [R◦], thus it follows that
A  ⊥. Quod non, since A is consistent.
Wemay conclude that [R◦]  A and hence that (∧[R◦]∨
A)  A. Since R implies [R◦]  A, it also follows that R
is false. Thus, [R◦] extends R. Let B := (∧[R◦] ∨ A). We
find: R ⊆ B ⊆ A and B  A. unionsq
4 Decomposition of Q
The theory Q has many unexpected extensions. We develop
one here that is especially useful for proving negative results
about Q. We will use it in the subsequent sections. The con-
struction is an adaptation of a result of Visser (2014). One
8 Note that the n in the context of M | An are used as sequences of
domain constants and not as sequences of numerals.
could say that only in the present paper the full meaning of
the construction of Visser (2014) is unfolded.
The theory Q# in the language of Q is axiomatized by the
following principles.
– Q
– ∀x∀y((Sx = x ∧ Sy = y) → S(x + y) = x + y)
– ∀x∀y((Sx = x ∧ Sy = y) → S(x · y) = x · y)
– ∃a∀x(x + a = a ∧ a + x = a)
It is easy to see that this a is unique. We call it ∞.
– ∃x(Sx = x ∧ x = ∞)
– ∀x∀y((x = Sx ∧ y = Sy) → (x + y = y ∧ y + x = y))
– ∀x∀y((x = Sx ∧ y = Sy) → (x + y = y∨x + y = ∞))
– ∀x∀y(y = Sy → x · y = ∞)
– ∀x∀y((x = Sx ∧ y = Sy) → x · SSy = x + x)
Theorem 3 below will have the immediate consequence that
Q# is consistent.
Let Q◦ be Q plus the axiom ∀xSx = x . Let CQC2 be
predicate logic with identity and one binary predicate symbol
R. Let 1 be the theory in the language of identity that states
that there is at most one object. The operation  is defined
and discussed in the “Sums” section of Appendix 1. The
notion of synonymy is defined in the “Provable equivalence
of interpretations” section of Appendix 1. We have:
Theorem 3 The theory Q# is synonymous to the theory Y :=
Q◦  CQC2  1.
Proof We define K : Y → Q# as follows.Wewrite Z for the
unary relational representation of zero, S for the binary rela-
tional representation of successor,A for the ternary relational
representation of addition, and M for the ternary relational
representation of multiplication.
– δK (x) :↔ x = x
– x =K y :↔ x = y
– 0K (x) :↔ Sx = x
– 1K (x) :↔ Sx = x ∧ x = ∞
– 2K (x) :↔ x = ∞
– ZK x :↔ Zx
– SK xy :↔ 0K (x) ∧ Sx = y
– AK xyz :↔ 0K (x) ∧ 0K (y) ∧ x + y = z
– MK xyz :↔ 0K (x) ∧ 0K (y) ∧ x · y = z
– RK xy :↔ 1K (x) ∧ 1K (y) ∧ x + y = ∞
It is easy to see that the specified translation does indeed
deliver the desired interpretation. We define M : Q# →
Y as follows. To make the interpretation readable we use
functional notation on the side of the interpreting theory.
The reader should keep in mind that, e.g. S is only defined
on 0. We write ∞ for the unique inhabitant of 2. Below
the itemized definition, we repeat the definitions of addition
and multiplication in more readable tabular form.
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– δM (x) :↔ x = x
– x =M y :↔ x = y
– ZM x :↔ x = 0
– SM xy :↔ Sx = y ∨ (¬0(x) ∧ x = y)
– AM xyz :↔ x + y = z ∨
(0(x) ∧ 1(y) ∧ z = y) ∨
(1(x) ∧ 0(y) ∧ z = x) ∨
(1(x) ∧ 1(y) ∧ Rxy ∧ z = ∞)
(1(x) ∧ 1(y) ∧ ¬ Rxy ∧ z = y) ∨
((x = ∞ ∨ y = ∞) ∧ z = ∞)
– MM xyz :↔ (y = 0∧ z = 0)∨ (y = 1∧AM (0, x, z))∨
∃u(y = SSu ∧ ((0(x) ∧ x · y = z) ∨
(1(x) ∧ ((Rxx ∧ z = ∞) ∨ (¬Rxx ∧ z = x))) ∨
(x = ∞ ∧ z = ∞))) ∨ ((1(y) ∨ y = ∞) ∧ z = ∞)
Here is the diagrammatic version of the definitions of addi-
tion and multiplication. In the diagrams, n ranges over 0
and x ranges over 1.
+M n y ∞
m m + n y ∞
x x ∞ if R(x, y) ∞
y otherwise
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
·M 0 1 n = 0, 1 y ∞
m 0 0 + m m · n ∞ ∞
x 0 x ∞ if R(x, x) ∞ ∞
x otherwise
∞ 0 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
The verification that the translation we specified does
indeed carry an interpretation of Q# is immediate. We treat
two sample cases of the verification of M ◦ K =0 IDY . We
have:
Y  (Axyz)K M ↔ (Sx = x ∧ Sy = y ∧ x + y = z)M
↔ 0(x) ∧ 0(y) ∧ (Axyz ∨ (. . .))
↔ Axyz
The last step uses the fact that the (. . .) implies that
¬(0(x) ∧ 0(y)).
Y  (Rxy)K M ↔ (Sx = x ∧ Sy = y ∧ x = ∞∧
y = ∞ ∧ x + y = ∞)M
↔ 1(x) ∧ 1(y) ∧ Rxy
↔ Rxy
We treat one sample case to illustrate that K ◦M =0 IDQ# .
Q#  (x + y = z)M K ↔ (x + y = z ∨
(0(x) ∧ 1(y) ∧ z = y) ∨
(1(x) ∧ 0(y) ∧ z = x) ∨
(1(x) ∧ 1(y) ∧ Rxy ∧ z = ∞)
(1(x) ∧ 1(y) ∧ ¬ Rxy ∧ z = y) ∨
((x = ∞ ∨ y = ∞) ∧ z = ∞))K
↔ (Sx = x ∧ Sy = y ∧ x + y = z) ∨
(Sx = x ∧ Sy = y ∧ y = ∞ ∧ z = y) ∨
(Sx = x ∧ x = ∞ ∧ Sy = y ∧ z = x) ∨
(Sx = x ∧ x = ∞ ∧ Sy = y ∧ y = ∞ ∧
x + y = ∞ ∧ z = ∞)
(Sx = x ∧ x = ∞ ∧ Sy = y ∧ y = ∞ ∧
x + y = ∞ ∧ z = y) ∨
((x = ∞ ∨ y = ∞) ∧ z = ∞)
↔ x + y = z
Of course, the last step is by verifying that if, e.g. Sx =
x ∧ x = ∞ ∧ Sy = y ∧ y = ∞, then x + y = ∞ ∧ z = ∞
iff x + y = z, and similarly for the other cases. unionsq
Theorem 4 Q  Q#.
Proof The theorem is a direct consequence of the fact that
QQ◦ via a definable cut, QCQC2 and Q1 in combi-
nation with Theorem 3, noting that  is (an implementation
of) the supremum in the degrees of interpretability. unionsq
5 Q is not a poly-pair theory
In this section we show that Q is not a poly-pair theory.
We explain the notion of poly-pair theory in Appendix 2.
In this same appendix we provide various basic facts about
poly-pair theories. These basics are mainly derived from our
paper (Visser 2013).
Theorem 5 Q is not a poly-pair theory.
Proof Suppose Q were a poly-pair theory. By our result of
Sect. 4, the theory Y is bi-interpretable with Q#. Since, by
the results of Appendix 2, the property of being a poly-pair
theory is upwards preserved under theory extension and is
preserved under bi-interpretations, is sufficient to show that
Y is not a poly-pair theory.
SupposeY is a poly-pair theory. Consider anymodelM of
Y inwhich the relation R is empty and inwhich the domain of
the second component is infinite. By the results inAppendix 2
the interpretation that witnesses the fact that Y is poly-pair
can be taken to be parameter-free, but we do not need to use
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the result. Suppose the parameters of our interpretation are
p and let the dimension be m.
Consider two m-sequences a and b in the second com-
ponent. We assume that the elements of a, b, p are pairwise
distinct. Let c be a pair (according to the interpretation) con-
taining a and b. Some element d of a, b does not occur in
c. Let e in the second component be disjoint from a, b, c, p.
Let σ be the operation of interchanging d and e. Clearly, σ
is an automorphism of our model that leaves p fixed. So c is
also a pair of σa and σb. Since either σa = a or σb = b,
this contradicts the defining property of pairing. unionsq
6 The Pudlák property
The Pudlák property of a theory U in its classical formula-
tions says: (i) there is an interpretation N  : S12 → U and
(ii) whenever N : S12 → U and N ′ : S12 → U , then there is
a U -definable, U -verifiable isomorphism F between certain
U -definable, U -verifiable cuts I of N and J of N ′. We take
our cuts to be downwards closed w.r.t. < and closed under
S, +, × and ω1.
To keep our treatment simple we only consider the case
of parameter-free interpretations. The case with parameters
is briefly discussed in Remark 1.
For our purposes, it is nicer to view the Pudlák prop-
erty in the light of the category INT1 of bi-interpretability.
See Appendix 1 for an introduction to bi-interpretability and
INT1.
We define a functor A from INT1 to the category of pre-
orders. Here we allow the empty preorder. Consider any
theory U . We send U to the structure A(U ). The elements
of A(U ) are interpretations N : S12 → U modulo i-
isomorphism. The structure A(U ) has a binary preordering
 defined by N  N ′ iff there is a U -definable, U -verifiable
initial embedding F from N to N ′.We note that the existence
of such an embedding is independent of the choice of the syn-
tactical representatives of N and N ′. If K : U → V , then
A(K ) : A(U ) → A(V ) is defined by A(K )(N ) := K ◦ N .
We note A(K ) does indeed preserve .
We remind the reader that a preorder is downward directed
if for every x and y, there is a z with z ≤ x and z ≤ y.
The Pudlák property for U is equivalent to: A(U ) is non-
empty and downward directed.
We remind the reader of Pavel Pudlák’s well-known result
from Pudlák (1985).
Theorem 6 (Pudlák) Sequential theories have the Pudlák
property.
We show that the converse of Pudlák’s result does not
hold in Appendix 3. Specifically, we show that, if U has the
Pudlák Property, then so does U  EQ. Here EQ is the pure
theory of equality in the minimal signature. It follows that,
e.g.S12EQ has the Pudlák Property. However, the methods
of Sect. 7 show that S12  EQ is not sequential.
Remark 1 What is the Pudlák Property in the case with para-
meters? It seems that there are lots of options. Instead of
systematically looking at various versions, I will just give the
one that I think is most attractive. For the basic definitions
and notations concerning parameters the reader is referred to
the “Adding parameters” section of Appendix 1.
First we generalize  to the case with parameters. We
define:
– N  N ′ iff, for some F , we have:
U  ∀q(αN ′(q) → ∃p (αN (p)∧ F(p, q) : N p  N ′q)).
Here (F(p, q) : N p  N ′q) means that F is a formula rep-
resenting an initial embedding of N p in N ′q, where domain
and range of F are cuts. We note that we could allow F to
have some extra parameters of its own, so that the formula
(F(p, q) : N p  N ′q) would become ∃r(F(p, q, r) : N p 
N ′q). However, we will refrain from doing so.
The Pudlák Property now takes a simple form: (i) There
is an N  : S12 → U and (ii) for every N : S12 → U , there
is a parameter-free N0 : S12 → U , such that N0  N . This
holds even in the case that the direct interpretation that wit-
nesses the sequentiality of U itself contains parameters. We
can rephrase this version of the Pudlák property as follows:
A(U ) is not empty, and the parameter-free interpretations are
coinitial in A(U ).
We note that the two interpretations N and N ′ in the for-
mulation of the parameter-free case can be subsumed under
a single interpretation with parameters N 〈x = 0〉N ′. So, the
Pudlák Property with parameters includes the one without
parameters.
Let us call my version of the Pudlák Property with para-
meters: the strong Pudlák Property. Sequential theories have
the strong Pudlák Property. This result holds even in the case
that U is sequential via a direct interpretation with parame-
ters. The result also holds in the poly-sequential case. We
refer the reader to Visser (2013), for details, specifically to
the second proof of Theorem 5.2 of that paper.
I have not worked out the full development of the case
with parameters. However note that we show that Q fails to
have the weaker property, so a fortiori it fails to have the
stronger property.
We collect some basic insights. Since the homomor-
phic image of a downward directed preorder is downward
directed, we have:
Theorem 7 Suppose K : U → V and U has the Pudlák




We show that A applied to an instance of the extension
relation is surjective.
Theorem 8 Suppose V is an extension of U in the same
language. Let embU V be the identical embedding. Suppose
further that A(U ) is non-empty. Then, A(embU V ) is surjec-
tive.
Proof Suppose N0 ∈ A(U ) and N ∈ A(V ). Let N1 :=
N 〈(∧S12)N 〉N0.9 Then, clearly N1 ∈ A(U ). Moreover,
embU V (N1) = N . unionsq
We remind the reader of the following. Consider a cate-
gory C. Suppose f : x → y and g : y → x and g ◦ f = idx .
In this case, we call f a section or split monomorphism. We
call g a retraction or split epimorphism. The object x is in
this situation a retract of y.
We show that A applied to a retraction is surjective.
Theorem 9 Suppose K : U → V is a retraction, then A(K )
is a retraction and hence surjective.
Proof Any functor preserves retractions. SoA(K ) is a retrac-
tion in the category of preorders. It follows that A(K ) is
surjective. unionsq
Question 1 We note that both retractions and theory exten-
sions are epimorphisms in INT1. Does A preserve epi-
morphisms? (Clearly an epimorphism in the category of
preorders is surjective.)
In Visser (2006), we proved that, in INT0, epimorphisms
can always be split in first a theory extension and then an
isomorphism. So, a fortiori, in INT0, epimorphisms are pre-
served by the INT0-analogue of A.
Theorem 10 Q does not have the Pudlák Property.
Proof By Theorem 3, we have extensions Q# and Q◦ of Q
such that Q# is synonymous to Y := Q◦  CQC2  1. We
extend CQC2 to AS with R in the role of ∈.10 Let A :=
Q◦  AS  1.
Suppose Q has the Pudlák Property. By Theorems 8 and
9, the property is preserved fromQ toQ#, fromQ# to Y, and
from Y to A.
Consider interpretations N : S12 → Q◦ and M : S12 →
AS. Let N∗ := in0 ◦ N : S12 → A and let M∗ := in1 ◦ M :
S12 → A. Suppose there is an embedding F in A of a cut of







1(y)  F(x, y) ↔
∨
j
(D j (x) ∧ E j (y)).
9 The notation K 〈A〉M is explained in the “Translations” and “Relative
interpretations” sections of Appendix 1.
10 For the definition of AS, see Appendix 2.
Here the D j are formulas in the range of in0 and the E j are
formulas in the range of in1. Suppose x is in D j . In that case
all y in E j are in the F-image of x. Hence, E j is closed under
=M∗ .Wemay conclude that the range of F is standardlyfinite
modulo =M∗ . Quod non. unionsq
7 PA− and Q
In this sectionwe show thatPA− is not sententially congruent
withQ.11 In a sense, we could have written this section with-
out even mentioning PA−, since the result that PA− and Q
are not sententially congruent follows from a much stronger
result proven here. However, since the theories PA− and Q
seem to be so close together, I feel that the specific result
concerning PA− and Q speaks more to the imagination than
the stronger result from which it follows.
To prove our main result, we need a few lemmas. We
will be interested in retractions in the category INT3 (see the
“Five categories” section of Appendix 1). This takes the fol-
lowing form: we have interpretations K : U → V and M :
V → U such that, for all U -sentences A, U  A ↔ AK M .
In this case K is a section or split monomorphism.
A basic insight is that the section relation has the forward
or zig property w.r.t. theory-extension in INT3. This is illus-
trated by the following diagram.








Theorem 11 The section relation in INT3 has the forward
or zig property with respect to theory extension.
Proof Suppose K : U → V is a section. We suppose that
M is an inverse of K , so M : V → U and M ◦ K = IDU .
We suppose also U ⊆ U ′. We define V ′ := {A ∈ sentV |
U ′  AM }. Clearly, we have an interpretation M ′ : V ′ → U ′
based on the same translation as M . We have:
U ′  B ⇒ U ′  BK M
⇒ V ′  BK
Hence there is an interpretation K ′ based on the same trans-
lation as K such that K ′ : U ′ → V ′. We find that K ′ is
a section, since BK
′M ′ is only dependent on the underlying
translations, and hence strictly identical to BK M . unionsq
11 The notion of sentential congruence is explained in “Five categories”
section of Appendix 1.
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We need a sufficient store of incomparable extensions of
given finitely axiomatised theories.We remind the reader that
a theory U tolerates or weakly interprets a theory V if, for
some translation τ , the theoryU +V τ is consistent. Note that
we take the identity axioms for ΣV including ∃xx = x to
be part of V . The following theorem can probably be much
improved, but it is what we need for the current application.
Theorem 12 Suppose A and B are finitely axiomatized the-
ories that tolerate S12. Then, there are finitely axiomatized
theories A ⊇ A and B ⊇ B, that are incomparable w.r.t.
, i.e. A  B and B  A.
Proof Suppose τ witnesses that A tolerates S12 and ν wit-
nesses that B tolerates S12. We take A
′ := A + (S12)τ and
B ′ := B + (S12)ν . So there is an N based on τ such that
N : S12 → A′ and there is an M based on ν such that
M : S12 → B ′. By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we find R
such that:

















We take A := A′ + RN and B := B ′ + ¬RM . Suppose
A  B. It follows that R or R⊥. In case we have R, we find,
by Σ1-completeness, that A′ ⊥. Quod non. If we have R⊥,
it follows that (B ′ + ¬RM )  (A′ + RN ), by the fixed point
equation. By Σ1-completeness, we have B ′  ⊥. Quod non.
We may conclude that A  B.
The proof that B  A is similar. unionsq
The following theorem gives the basic simple insight con-
cerning the unsplittability of connected theories. For the
definition of connected see the “Sums” section of Appen-
dix 1.
Theorem 13 Suppose U and V are incomparable w.r.t. local
interpretability. Then U  V is not connected. It follows that
no connected theory W can be mutually locally interpretable
with U  V .
Proof Suppose that U and V are incomparable w.r.t. local
interpretability and that U  V is connected. Since (U 
V ) loc (U  V ), it follows, by connectedness, that either
U locally interprets U  V or V locally interprets U  V .
Suppose U locally interprets U  V . Then, U loc (U 
V ) loc V . So, U loc V . Quod non. The assumption that V
locally interprets U  V leads similarly to a contradiction.
unionsq
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 14 Q cannot be an INT3-retract of a sequential
theory.
Proof We work in INT3. Suppose U is sequential and Q is a
retract of U . We derive a contradiction.
We have Q ⊆ Q# and, hence by Theorem 11, we can find
a theory V ⊇ U such that Q# is a retract of V . Since Q# is
synonymous with Y, the theory Q# is a fortiori, sententially
congruent to Y. It follows that Y is an INT3-retract of V .
We can interpret S12 in Q
◦, so Q◦ tolerates S12. We can
extend CQC2 to the weak set theory AS which interprets
S12. So, CQC
2 tolerates S12. It follows that CQC
2  1 toler-
ates S12.
12 Let A ⊇ Q◦ and B ⊇ CQC2  1 be the mutually
incomparable theories promised by Theorem 12. By Theo-
rem 11, we can find a theory W ⊇ V such that A  B is a
retract of W .
It follows that A  B is mutually locally interpretable
with W . Moreover, A and B are incomparable w.r.t. local
interpretability, since they are finitely axiomatized. This con-
tradicts the result of Theorem 13.

















We may conclude that Q is not a retract of a sequential
theory. unionsq
From our theorem, we immediately have that Q and PA−
are not sententially congruent.
We note that the only property we used in our proof of
sequential theories is the fact that sequential theories are
closed under theory-extension-in-the-same-language. Thus
for any class X of connected theories, such that X is closed
under theory-extension, we have that Q cannot be an INT3-
retract of X .
8 Concluding remarks
The paper shows that the Pudlák Property and being a
poly-pair theory are not preserved under mutual (faithful)
interpretability. This provides two examples of good proper-
ties of theories that are not preserved under mutual (faithful)
interpretability.13 It illustrates the usefulness of having more
refined notions of sameness of theories.
Connectedness is preserved under mutual interpretability
and even under mutual local interpretability. It is a notion of
non-splittability. Aswe have seen the theoryQ is splittable in
12 I am using here that  is associative modulo synonymy.
13 A trivial example of a property not preserved under mutual inter-




a sense, but this splittability is under the radar of the notion
of connectedness, since Q is connected. This discrepancy
suggests that it might be interesting to explore more refined
versions of connectedness that would exclude Q but include
PA−.
We note that our results in Sect. 7 imply that Q is con-
nected but has a non-connected extension, to wit (a theory
synonymous to) a theory of the form A  B, where A and
B are finitely axiomatized theories that are mutually incom-
parable w.r.t. relative interpretability. The natural class of
sequential theories, however, is upwards closed under theory-
extension. So, one may wonder if a more refined version of
connectedness would have the property of being preserved
under theory-extension.
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Appendix 1: Basics
In this appendix, we provide detailed definitions of trans-
lations, interpretations and morphisms between interpreta-
tions.
Theories
Theories in this paper are one-sorted theories of first order
predicate logic of finite relational signature. We take identity
to be a logical constant. Our official signatures are rela-
tional, however, via the term-unwinding algorithm, we can
also accommodate signatures with functions. For most pur-
poses in the present paper, a theory can be identified with a
deductively closed set of sentences of the given language.The
exception is the few places where we use Rosser style argu-
ments. We only do this in the context of finitely axiomatized
theories. We assume that we employ the obvious axiomati-
zations in these cases.
Translations
Translations are the heart of our interpretations. In fact, they
are often confused with interpretations, but we will not do
that officially. In practice it is often convenient to conflate an
interpretation and its underlying translation.
To formulate the notion of translation, a number of sub-
tleties and details concerning the choice and use of variables
in the translations will be only sketched in a hand waving
way.
We define more-dimensional, one-piece relative trans-
lations without parameters. Let Σ and Θ be one-sorted
signatures. A translation τ : Σ → Θ is given by a triple
〈m, δ, F〉. Here δ(v0, . . . , vm−1)will be the domain formula.
The mapping F associates to each relation symbol R of Σ
with arity n a formula A(v0, . . . , vn−1) of signature Θ . Here
the vi are sequences of variables of length m. The vi and the
v j , for i = j are disjoint.
We demand that predicate logic proves
F(R)(x0, . . . , xn−1) → (δ(x0) ∧ . . . δ(xn−1)).
Of course, given any candidate F(R) not satisfying the
restriction, we can obviously modify the formula to satisfy
the restriction.
We translate Σ-formulas to Θ-formulas as follows.14
– (R(x0, . . . , xn−1))τ := F(R)(x0, . . . , xn−1).
The single variable xi of the source language needs to
have no obvious connection with the sequence of vari-
ables xi of the target language that represents it. We
need some conventions to properly handle the associa-
tion xi → xi .15
– (·)τ commutes with the propositional connectives;
– (∀x A)τ := ∀x(δ(x) → Aτ );
– (∃x A)τ := ∃x(δ(x) ∧ Aτ ).
Here are some convenient conventions and notations.
– We write δτ for ‘the δ of τ ’ and Fτ for ‘the F of τ ’.
– We write Rτ for Fτ (R).
– We write x ∈ δ for: δ(x).
14 We assume possible variable clashes resulting by the substitution of
the x’s for the v’s to be resolved by α-conversion.
15 There are several ways of handling such conventions. First we can
workwith a fixed global association between the xi and the xi . Secondly,
we can make such an association local and carry it around as an extra
argument of the translation. Thirdly, we can throw away the mechanism
of using variable-names and work in a language that works with explicit
links between places. Fourthly, we can sidestep the problem byworking
in many-sorted languages and, for every k, adding sequences of length
k (of various sorts). This construction can be viewed as a representation
of more dimensional interpretations as arrows in a Kleisli category.
Regrettably, each way of proceeding needs some work and produces
some awkwardness somewhere.We demand that the xi are fully disjoint
when the xi are different. In this paper, we will assume that these details
are taken care of by one strategy or by another.
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There are some natural operations on translations. The iden-
tity translation id := id is one-dimensional and it is defined
by:
– δid(x) := (x = x),
– Rid(x) := Rx.
We can compose relative translations as follows. Suppose
τ is an m-dimensional translation from Σ to Θ , and ν is a
k-dimensional translation fromΘ toΞ . We define the m×k-
dimensional interpretation τν or ν ◦ τ as follows.
– We suppose that with the variable x we associate under
τ the sequence x0, . . . , xm−1 and under ν we send xi to
xi .
δτν(x0, . . . , xm−1) := (δν(x0) ∧ . . . ∧ δν(xm−1) ∧
(δτ (x))
ν),
– Let R be n-ary. Suppose that under τ we associate with xi
the sequence xi,0, . . . , xi,m−1 and that under ν we asso-
ciate with xi, j the sequence xi, j . We take:
Rτν(x0,0, . . . xn−1,m−1)
= δτ (x0,0) ∧ . . . ∧ δτ (xn−1,m−1) ∧
(Rτ (x0,0, . . . xn−1,m−1))ν.
We can make a disjunctive interpretation as follows. Sup-
pose τ and ν are translations from Σ to Θ . We assume
that τ is k-dimensional and ν is m-dimensional. Let A be
a -sentence. We introduce a max(k, m)-dimensional inter-
pretation τ 〈A〉ν.
We first ‘lift’ one of the interpretations by padding to get
the dimensions equal. Suppose, e.g. that k < m. Then we
define:
– δτ ′(xz) :↔ δτ (x),
– Pτ ′(x0z0, . . . , xn−1zn−1) :↔ Pτ (x0, . . . , xn−1).
Here the dimension of the z is m − k.
Suppose the results of the padding operation are τ ′ and ν′,
where, of course, in case k < m, ν = ν′, etcetera. We define
τ 〈A〉ν as follows:
– δτ 〈A〉ν(x) := ((A ∧ δτ ′(x)) ∨ (¬A ∧ δν′(x))).
– Rτ 〈A〉ν(x0, . . . , xn−1) :=
((A ∧ Rτ ′(x0, . . . , xn−1)) ∨ (¬A ∧ Rν′(x0, . . . , xn−1))) .
Here the x are max(k, m)-dimensional.
An m-dimensional translation τ preserves identity if
x =τ y :↔
∧
i<m
(δτ (xi ) ∧ δτ (yi ) ∧ xi = yi ).
An m-dimensional translation τ is unrelativized if δτ (x) =
. An m-dimensional translation τ is direct if it is unrela-
tivized and preserves identity. Note that all these properties
are preserved by composition (modulo provable equivalence
in predicate logic).
Consider a model M with domain M of signature Σ
and k-dimensional translation τ : Σ → Θ . Suppose the
τ -translations of the identity axioms, including ∃x x = x ,
are true in M. Let N := {m ∈ Mk | M | δτ m}.
Let E be the equivalence relation on N defined in M by
=τ . Then τ specifies an internal model N of M with
domain N/E and with N | R([m0]E , . . . , [mn−1]E ) iff
M | Rτ (m0, . . . , mn−1).Wewill write τ˜ (M) for the inter-
nal model of M given by τ .
We treat the mapping τ,M → τ˜M as a partial function
that is defined precisely if the translations of the identity
axioms are true in M. Let Mod or (˜·) be the function that
maps τ to τ˜ . We have:
Mod(τ ◦ ρ)(M) = (Mod(ρ) ◦ Mod(τ ))(M).
So, Mod behaves contravariantly.
Relative interpretations
A translation τ supports a relative interpretation of a theory
U in a theory V , if, for all U -sentences A, we have U 
A ⇒ V  Aτ . Note that this automatically takes care of the
theory of identity and assures us that δτ is inhabited. We will
write K = 〈U, τ, V 〉 for the interpretation supported by τ .
We write K : U → V for: K is an interpretation of the form
〈U, τ, V 〉. If M is an interpretation, τM will be its second
component, so M = 〈U, τM , V 〉, for some U and V .
Par abus de langage,wewrite ‘δK ’ for: δτK ; ‘RK ’ for: RτK ;
‘AK ’ for: AτK , etc. Here are the definitions of three central
operations on interpretations.
– Suppose U has signature Σ . We define:
IDU : U → U is 〈U, idΣ,U 〉.
– Suppose K : U → V and M : V → W . We define:
M ◦ K : U → W is 〈U, τM ◦ τK , W 〉.
– Suppose K : U → (V + A) and M : U → (V + ¬ A).
We define:
K 〈A〉M : U → V is 〈U, τK 〈A〉τM , V 〉.
It is easy to see that we indeed correctly defined interpreta-
tions between the theories specified.
Five categories
We do not automatically get a category of theories and inter-
pretations from the machinery we built up until now. For
example, IDU ◦ IDU will not be strictly speaking identical
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with IDU . We will obtain a category, when we divide out a
suitable equivalence among interpretations. Below we will
consider five kinds of equivalence that will give us five dif-
ferent categories. One important point of the categories is
that isomorphism in each of them defines a salient notion of
sameness of theories.
Provable equivalence of interpretations
Two interpretations are provably equivalent when the target
theory thinks they are the same. Specifically, two interpreta-
tions K , M : U → V are provably equivalent if they have
the same dimension, say m, and:
– V  ∀x(δK (x) ↔ δM (x)),
– V  ∀x0, . . . , xn−1∈δK (RK (x0, . . . , xn−1) ↔
RM (x0, . . . , xn−1)).
Modulo this identification, the operations identity and com-
position give rise to a category INT0, where the theories are
objects and the interpretations arrows. Isomorphism in this
category is synonymy or definitional equivalence. This is the
strictest notion of identity between theories in the literature.
It was first introduced by de Bouvère (1965a, b).
LetMOD be the categorywith as objects classes ofmodels
and as morphisms all functions between these classes. We
define Mod(U ) as the class of all models of U . Suppose
K : U → V . Then, Mod(K ) is the function from Mod(V )
to Mod(U ) given by: M → K˜ (M) := τ˜K (M). It is clear
that Mod is a contravariant functor from INT0 to MOD.16
Maps between interpretations
For many applications provable equivalence is too strict. A
better notions is provable isomorphism or i-isomorphism.
Consider K , M : U → V . Suppose K is m-dimensional
and M is k-dimensional. An i-isomorphism between inter-
pretations K , M : U → V is given by a formula F with
m + k free variables in the language of V .17 We demand that
V verifies that “F is an isomorphism between K and M”, or,
equivalently, that, for each model M of V , the function FM
is an isomorphism between K˜ (M) and M˜(M).
We spell out the syntactical definition of an i-isomorphism
F : K ⇒ M .
– V  x F y → (x ∈ δK ∧ y ∈ δM ).
– V  (x =K u ∧ u F v ∧ v =M y) → x F y.
– V  ∀x ∈ δK ∃y ∈ δM x F y.
– V  ∀y ∈ δM∃x ∈ δK x F y.
16 Of course, there is a foundational issue with this definition. Let’s say
that we work in Gödel–Bernays set theory to understand the definition.
17 The ‘i’ in ‘i-isomorphism’ stands for interpretation.
– V  (x0Fy0 ∧ . . . xn−1Fyn−1) →
(RK (x0, . . . , xn−1) ↔ RM (y0, . . . , yn−1)).
Here the last item includes identity in the role of R!
Two interpretations K , M : U → V , are i-isomorphic iff
there is an i-isomorphism between K and M . Wilfrid Hodges
calls this notion: homotopy. See Hodges (1993, p. 222).
We can also define the notion of being i-isomorphic
semantically. The interpretations K , M : U → V , are i-
isomorphic iff there is an F such that, for all V -models,
M, the relation FM is an isomorphism between K˜ (M) and
M˜(M).
The default in this paper is that theories have finite sig-
nature: in this case we have a third characterization. The
interpretations K , M : U → V , are i-isomorphic iff, for
every V -model M, there is an M-definable isomorphism
between K˜ (M) and M˜(M). This characterization follows
by a simple compactness argument.
Clearly, if K and M are provably equivalent in the sense
of the previous subsubsection, they will be i-isomorphic. The
notion of i-isomorphism give rise to a category of interpre-
tations modulo i-isomorphism. We call this category INT1.
Isomorphism in INT1 is
bi-interpretability. Bi-interpretability is a very good notion
of sameness that preserves such diverse properties as finite
axiomatizability and κ-categoricity.
Isomorphism
Our third notion of sameness of the basic list is that K and M
are the same if, for all models M of V , the internal models
K˜ (M) and M˜(M) are isomorphic. We will simply say that
K and M are isomorphic. Clearly, i-isomorphism implies
isomorphism. We call the associated category INT2. Isomor-
phism in INT2 is iso-congruence.
Elementary equivalence
The fourth notion is to say that two interpretations K and M
are the same if, for each M, the internal models K˜ (M) and
M˜(M) are elementary equivalent. We will say that K and
M are elementary equivalent.
By the completeness theorem, we easily see that this
notion can be alternatively defined by saying that K is ele-
mentary equivalent to M iff, for all U -sentences A, we
have V  AK ↔ AM . It is easy to see that isomorphism
implies elementary equivalence. We call the associated cate-




Identity of source and target
Finally, we have the option of abstracting away from the
specific identity of interpretations completely, simply count-
ing any two interpretations K , M : U → V the same. The
associated category is INT4. This is simply the structure of
degrees of (global) interpretability DEGglob. Isomorphism
in INT4 is mutual interpretability.
Global and local interpretability
We can view interpretability as a generalization of provabil-
ity. When we take this stand point, we write:
– UV (or V U ) for:U interprets V (or V is interpretable
in U ).
– U ≡ V for: U and V are mutually interpretable.
A closely related notion is local interpretability.We define
– U locally interprets V or U loc V iff, for every finitely
axiomatize subtheory V0 of V we have U  V0.
– We write V loc U and U ≡loc V with the obvious
meanings.
Ifwewant to stress the contrast between local and ordinary
interpretability, we often call ordinary interpretability global
interpretability. We will write glob, etcetera. The degrees
of local interpretability are DEGloc.
Example 1 Let  be the theory in the language of identity
that says that there are precisely two elements. Let INF be
the theory in the language of identity that has for every n an
axiom saying ‘there are at least n elements’. Then loc INF
but  glob INF
Weak interpretability or tolerance
We say that a theory U weakly interprets a theory V , or that
U tolerates V if, for some interpretation τ : ΣV → ΣU , the
theory U + V τ is consistent. Here we take V to contain the
axioms of identity including ∃xx = x . We note that:
– U tolerates V , iff for some consistent extension (in the
same language) U ′ of U , we have U ′  V .
– If U tolerates V and V  W , then U tolerates W .
Adding parameters
We can add parameters in the obvious way. An interpretation
K : U → V with parameterswill have a k-dimensional para-
meter domain α (given by a formula in k variables), where
V  ∃xαx. We allow the extra variables x to occur in the
translations of the U -formulas. We sometimes write K x to
make the dependence on the parameters visible. We write
AK ,x for the K -translation of A for parameters x.
The condition for K to be an interpretations changes into:
 ∀x(αx → AK ,x), for all sentences A such that U  A.
Note that this automatically takes care of the axioms of iden-
tity and the non-emptiness of the domain.
Notions like direct interpretation are lifted in the obvious
way to the case where we allow parameters.
We note that, in the presence of parameters, the functor K˜
associates a class of models of U to a model of V .
Similar adaptations are needed to define i-isomorphisms
with parameters.
Piecewise interpretability
The idea of piecewise interpretability is that we can build up
the domain from a number of pieces that may or may not be
of the same dimension and that may or may not overlap. The
same object of the interpreting theory may occur in different
roles posing as different objects of the interpreted theory.
We will not develop piecewise interpretability here. We just
given an example of how it works.
Suppose we have two pieces a and b. Let’s say that a is
1-dimensional and b is 2-dimensional. Suppose we have no
parameters.
We want to translate P(u3, u1). How are we going to do
it? Well, we need to know in what pieces u1 and u3 are
supposed to be. We need a function g as argument in the
translation as an oracle that tells us precisely that. Suppose
that, according to g, u1 is in piece a and u3 is in piece b.
We note that g in combination with our formula P(u3, u1)
placesb on the first argument place anda on the second argu-
ment place. So, F must tell us the translation for P when
the first argument is b and the second argument is a. Let
f be a function that associates pieces to argument places.
Thus, we need F(P, f ), where f (0) = b and f (1) = a.
We may choose F(P, f ) be A(u, v, w), where A is depen-
dent on f . We may view P(u3, u1) as given by P plus a
function h that associates variables to argument places. Thus
(P(u3, u1))τ,g := F(P, g ◦ h)(u30, u31, u10).
Here is the clause for the universal quantifier for the vari-
able u2.








δbτ (u20, u21) → Aτ,g[u2:b]
))
,
where g[u2 : j] is the result of setting g at u2 to j .
So we handle quantification over the different pieces simply




We can miraculously conjure any finite number of ele-
ments out of nothing, simply by creating sufficiently many
pieces containing one element.
If the target theory V proves that we have at least two
elements,we can always replace a piecewise interpretation by
a many-dimensional piece-less one modulo i-isomorphism.
Sums
We define the operation  on theories as follows. The signa-
ture of U  V is the disjoint union of the signatures of U and
V , plus two new unary predicates 0 and 1. The axioms of
U  V are:
– P(x0, . . . , xn−1) → ∧i<n 0(xi ), if P is derived from
the signature of U ,
– Q(y0, . . . , ym−1) → ∧ j<m 1(y j ), if Q is derived from
the signature of V ,
– the axioms of U relativized to 0,
– the axioms of V relativized to 1,
– ∀x(0(x) ∨ 1(x)),
– ∀x¬(0(x) ∧ 1(x)).
We treat identity as outside of the signature here. We have
the ordinary theory of identity.
We note that U  V is synonymous with V  U and
(U V )W is synonymous withU (V W ) and that both
are synonymous with the ternary sum (U, V, W ) which is
defined in the obvious way using 0, 1 and 2.
We show that  is the sum in the categories INTi for
1 ≤ i ≤ 4 on the assumption that one of the theories U and
V proves that there are at least two elements. We remind the















The arrow in0 interprets U in U  V by relativization to
0.We note that, by our conventionswe should take x =in0 y
iff 0(x) ∧ 0(y) ∧ x = y. The other predicate symbols do
not need this addition. The definition of in1 is similar.
Suppose K : U → W and M : V → W . We sup-
pose further that one of U and V proves that there are at
least two elements. As a first step we make the domains
of K and M in W disjoint and of the same dimension.
We note that W proves that there are at least two ele-
ments. This follows from our assumption that at least one
of U and V proves that there are at least two elements.
Let the dimension of δK be k and the dimension of δM be
m. Suppose, e.g. k ≤ m. We replace (x0, . . . xk−1) in δK
by (z, z, w0, . . . , wm−k−1, x0, . . . xk−1) in δK ′ , where z and
the wi can be arbitrary. We replace (y0, . . . , ym−1) in δK
by (z, z′, y0, . . . , ym−1), where z, z′ can be arbitrary under
the constraint that z = z′. Still under the assumption that
m ≤ k, we define (z, z, w0, . . . , wm−k−1, x0, . . . xk−1) =K ′
(z′, z′, w′0, . . . , w′m−k−1, x ′0, . . . x ′k−1) iff (x0, . . . xk−1) =K
(x ′0, . . . x ′k−1). Etcetera. Let the newly obtained interpreta-
tions (considered as syntactical objects) be K ′ and M ′. As is
easily seen K ′ and M ′ have disjoint domains and the same
dimensions and are equivalent to K , respectively M in each
of INTi , where i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The interpretation [K ′, M ′] is the obvious one where the
new domain is the union of the domains of K ′ and M ′.
It is easy to see that, in each of the categories INTi , for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the arrow [K ′, M ′] is unique with the desired
property. Hence U  V is indeed the sum in all of these
theories.
As we have seen, the sum construction only works when
at least one of the summands has provably two elements in
its domain. If we have piecewise interpretations, we would
not need this assumption. In this case the construction would
become much simpler, since both padding and making dis-
joint become superfluous. There is an alternative construction
of a sum U ⊕ V in Mycielski et al. (1990) or Stern (1989).
This alternative construction is, for many purposes, more
convenient. The reason that we use  in this paper is that in
Theorem 3 we obtain synonymy for . (The theories U ⊕ V
and U  V are bi-interpretable but not synonymous.)
We have the following basic theorem.
Theorem 15 Consider the theory W := U  V . Consider
any formula Axy in the language of W . Then, there are for-
mulas Bi x in the language of U and formulas C j y in the
language of V , such that Axy is equivalent to a boolean com-
bination of B in0i x and C
in1
j y in the theory W +
∧
k 0(xk)+∧1(y).18
Proof The proof of the theorem is by a simple induction on
A. unionsq
An important notion that is defined in terms of the notion
of sum is connectedness.We say that a theory W is connected
if, for any theoriesU and V , if (U V )locW , thenU locW
or V loc W . The following fundamental theorem is due to
Pudlák (1983). It was reproved with a markedly different
proof by Stern (1989). For more context, see also Mycielski
et al. (1990).
Theorem 16 Every sequential theory is connected.
The notion of sequentiality is introduced in Appendix 2.
18 Here we treat the variables xk and y as parameters. They are not
supposed to be universally generalized away.
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Appendix 2: Pair theories and sequential theories
Pair theories and sequential theories are theories in which
containers or data structures of a certain kind are present for
all objects of a given theory. The presence of such containers
provides many good properties for such theories. For exam-
ple, recursively enumerable pair theories can be axiomatised
by a scheme. See Visser (2012). Sequential theories are
locally reflexive due to the presence of partial satisfaction
predicates. We refer the reader to Visser (2013) for more
information about poly-sequential theories.
Basic definitions
We consider the theory of non-surjective unordered pairing
PAIR and adjunctive set theory AS. The language of both
theories has just a binary predicate symbol ∈ (in addition
to identity that is standardly available). The theory PAIR is
axiomatised as follows:
PAIR1.  ∃x∀yy /∈ x
PAIR2.  ∃z∀u(u ∈ z ↔ (u = x ∨ u = y))
The theory AS is given by:
AS1.  ∃x∀yy /∈ x
AS2.  ∃z∀u(u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∨ u = y))
A theory is poly-sequential if it directly interprets AS. A
theory is a poly-pair theory if it directly interprets PAIR. A
theory is sequential if it directly interprets AS via a direct
1-dimensional interpretation. A theory is a pair theory if it
directly interprets PAIR via a 1-dimensional interpretation.
Below we will mainly develop the poly-pair case. The
proofs in the sequential case are entirely analogous.
We note that using the Kuratowski pairing we can obtain
(non-extensional) ordered pairs inPAIR. Using iterated pair-
ing we can obtain non-extensional sequences of length n, for
each natural number n. Thus, we have a predicate SEQn and
projection relations πi for each i < n. We define
(x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈n y
:↔ ∃z (SEQn(z) ∧ π0(z, x0) ∧
· · · ∧ πn−1(z, xn−1) ∧ z ∈ y) .
One can show that:
(i)  ∃x∀y y /∈n x
(ii)  ∃z∀u (u ∈n z ↔ (u = x ∨ u = y))
Preservation under theory extension
Since direct interpretations are closed under composition,
each theory that directly interprets a poly-pair theory is itself
a poly-pair theory. Obviously, the identical embedding of a
theory in an extension-in-the-same-language is direct. Ergo,
being a poly-pair theory is preserved under extension-in-
the-same-language. Similar remarks hold for poly-sequential
theories.
Preservation under bi-interpretations
We show a slightly stronger result.
Theorem 17 Let U be a poly-pair theory and suppose that
V is a retraction in INT1 of U. Then, V is a poly-pair theory.
Proof To simplify the argument inessentiallywe ignore para-
meters.
Let K : U → V and M : V → U and let F be an
i-isomorphism from IDV to K ◦ M witnessing the retrac-
tion. We assume that K is k-dimensional and that M is
m-dimensional. Let (·) be the interpretation of PAIR in U .
Say (·) is -dimensional. We define a k-dimensional inter-
pretation (·)† of PAIR in V as follows:
v ∈† u :↔ ∃w
(




– v has length k.
– w has length k2m. It is of the form w0, . . . , wk−1,
where each wi has length km and vi F wi . The wi stand
for elements of δK◦M . Note that the definition of an i-
isomorphism forces the wi to be in δK◦M .
– u has length k. It stands for a sequence u0, . . . , u−1,
where the u j have length k. The u j stand for elements
of δK . (In case they do not, we don’t care. It is sufficient
for our purposes that the ‘correct’ sequences u provide
all the unordered pairs we want.)
– The ∈km lives inside K . Here its first component is km
dimensional and its second component -dimensional.
Looking at it from the outer level of IDV , the first compo-
nent acquires dimension k2m and its second component
acquires dimension k.
A moment’s reflection shows that our definition indeed
gives us an interpretation ofPAIR in V . We note that literally
the same construction works for AS. unionsq
Elimination of parameters
We show that we can eliminate the parameters from awitness
of the property of being a pair theory.
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Theorem 18 Suppose U is a poly-pair theory. Then, U is a
poly-pair theory via a direct interpretation without parame-
ters.
Proof Consider any poly-pair theory U . Let (·) be the
witnessing interpretation of PAIR in U . Suppose (·) is k-
dimensional and that M has an -dimensional parameter
domain α. Let ak + b = k + , where a and b are natural
numbers and b < k. We define a parameter-free interpreta-
tion (·)† of dimension k +  as follows.
x ∈† (p, y) :↔ ∃z(x, z) ∈pa+1 y.
Here x has length k + , i.e. ak + b. The block z is just
padding and has length k − b. Thus, the length of (x, z) is
(a+1)k. Finally, the length of y is k and, therefore, the length
of (p, y) is k + .
We can easily verify that ∈† yields an interpretation of
PAIR. The argument in the case of AS is very similar. unionsq
Appendix 3: The converse of the Pudlák property
fails
The following theorem is one of these utterly strange cases
where the fact proven seems totally obvious, but where one
still has to work to obtain the desired result. It would be inter-
esting to prove the theorem using the quantifier elimination
for EQ.
Theorem 19 Let U and V be theories of finite signature. We
suppose that U proves that there are at least two elements.19
Suppose V includes the theory of linear order for, say, <.
Then any interpretation K : V → (U  EQ) (with para-
meters) is i-isomorphic in U  EQ to an interpretation with
parameters K  : V → (U EQ), where both the parameter
domain and the object domain consist of sequences from the
U-domain 0.
Proof Consider any model M  I of U  EQ. We work in
M. We have the U -domain 0 and the EQ-domain 1. We
use a, b, c, . . . to range over 0, we use x, y, z, . . . to range
over 1 and we use u, v, w, . . . to range over the mixed
domain.
Suppose that K is an m-dimensional interpretation and
that K has a parameter domain that is -dimensional. Let s
be the smallest number such that 2s ≥  + m + 2.
We define, for any n, a formula Gn(a, u), where the length
of a is sn and the length of u is n. Here we intend to only
consider Gn for n ≤ + m. The idea behind the formula Gn
is that it represents the relation ‘a mimicks u’.
19 This assumption becomes superfluous when we allow piece-wise
interpretations.
– a Gn u iff
(i) whenever ui is in 0, then asi = asi+1 = · · · =
asi+s−1 = ui ;
(ii) whenever ui is in 1, then there are j and j ′ such
that j < j ′ < s and asi+ j = asi+ j ′ ;
(iii) whenever ui and u j are in 1, then:
ui = u j iff (asi , . . . , asi+s−1) =
(as j , . . . , as j+s−1).
We define a translation τ .
– ατ(a) :↔ ∃u(a G u ∧ ατK (u)),
– δaτ(b) :↔ ∃u∃v(ab G+m uv ∧ δuτK (v)),
– Paτ(b0, . . . , bp−1) :↔ ∃u∃v0 · · · ∃vp−1(
ab0 G+m uv0 ∧ · · · ∧ abp−1 G+m uvp−1
∧PτK (v0, · · · , vp−1)
)
.
We define the relation R between the parameters and the
corresponding i-isomorphism F as follows:
– a R u :↔ a G u ∧ ατK (u).
– b Fa,u v :↔ ab G+m uv ∧ δuτK (v).
Our first order of business is to show that R is total and sur-
jective between ατ and ατK . That it is total is immediate
from the definition of ατ . We show that it is surjective. Con-
sider any u in ατ . To find a G-counterpart a, we have only
to match the pattern of identity versus non-identity between
the 1-elements of u. To do that we need at most  different
sequences c of length s that represent 1-elements—in the
most demanding case the elements of u are all in 1 and
are all different. Since 1 contains at least two elements, we
have at least 2s sequences of length s. (We note that we do
not need to introduce extra parameters for the two elements,
since we are only interested in sameness and difference of
these sequences.) Since the constant sequences are reserved
for representing elements from 0, we need that 2s ≥ + 2.
By our choice of s this is true.
Suppose we fix parameters a and u such that a R u. We
want to show that Fa,u is an bijection between δaτ and δ
u
τK
modulo the respective identities of τ ,a and τuK .
We first prove that Fa,u is total. Consider b in δaτ . By
definition, there are u′ and v′ such that ab G+m u′v′. There
is an automorphism σ of I that maps 1-elements of u′ to
the corresponding elements of u. Take v := σ(v′). It follows
that b Fa,u v.
We prove that Fa,u is surjective. Consider v ∈ δuτK . We
need to find a b such that ab G+m uv. For we need the
sameness-difference pattern of the 1-elements of ab with
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the given pattern of the 1-elements of uv. Since we have
chosen 2s ≥  + m + 2 we can always do this.
We prove that Fa,u is functional. Suppose b =aτ b′ and
b Fa,u v and b′ Fa,u v′. We note that, for some w and w′, we
have ab G+m uw and ab′ G+m uw′ and w =uτK w′. We
claim that v =uτK w and, similarly, that v′ =uτK w′. Assuming
the claim,we have v =uτK w =uτK w′ =uτK v′ andwe are done.
We note that uv and uw have the same sameness-difference
pattern on the 1 elements.
We prove the claim. Suppose, to get a contradiction that
v =uτK w. It follows that either v <uτK w. or w <uτK v. We
assume, e.g. that v <uτK w. The other case is analogous.
Suppose 1 (i.e. the domain of I) is finite. There clearly
is an automorphism σ of I such that σ(uv) = uw, where we
leave the 0-elements in place. We have:
v <uτK σ(v) <
u
τK
σ 2(v) <uτK · · ·
Since I was supposed to be finite, this is impossible.
SupposeI is infinite.Wefirst assume that the1-elements
in v and w that are not in u are disjoint. In this case there is a
I-automorphism σ such that σ(uv) = uw and σ(uw) = uv.
It follows that:
uw = σ(uv) <uτK σ(uw) = uv.
A contradiction. So v =uτK w. In case the 1-elements in v
and w that do not occur in u are not fully disjoint, we find
a z such that ab G+m uz and the 1-elements in z that are
not in u are disjoint from all 1-elements in u, v and w. We
now use our earlier argument, to see that v =uτK z =uτK w.
We prove that Fau is injective. Suppose b Fau v, b′ Fau
v′ and v =uτK v′. Then, by the definition of =aτ , we find:
b =aτ b′.
Finally we want to show that, if b0 Fau v0 and …and
bp−1 Fau vp−1, then:
Paτ(b0, . . . , bp−1) iff PuτK (v0, . . . , vp−1).
But this is immediate by the definition of Paτ and the fact
that F is a bijection.
We define K  := 〈V, τ ,U  EQ〉. It is easy to
see that, by the Completeness Theorem, K  satisfies the
desiderata. unionsq
We are now ready to prove the Pudlák’s Property for U 
EQ, whenever U is sequential.
Theorem 20 Suppose U is sequential. Then, we have both
the Pudlák property and the strong Pudlák property for U 
EQ.
Proof We just consider the strong property. Suppose N :
S12 → U  EQ. We can find N  : S12 → U  EQ that is
i-isomorphic to N such that the parameter domain α and the
object domain δ of N  are entirely in 0. Note that the defi-
nitions of the corresponding translations are not necessarily
entirely in the U -part of the language.
Suppose the dimension of the parameter domain of N  is k
and the dimension of N  ism.We expand the signatureΣU of
U with new symbols α˜, δ˜, Z˜, A˜, M˜. Here α˜ is k-dimensional,
Z˜ is (k + m)-dimensional, S˜ is (k + 2m)-dimensional, A˜ is
(k + 3m)-dimensional, M˜ is (k + 3m)-dimensional. Let the
resulting signature be Σ˜U . We define a translation τ˜ from the
signature of arithmetic into Σ˜U , by taking ατ˜ (u) := α˜(u),
δτ˜ (u, v) := δ˜(u, v), Zτ˜ (v, u) := Z˜(v, u), etcetera.
Let U˜ := U + ∀u (˜α(u) → (S12)τ˜ ,u). Here the axioms
of S12 are supposed to include the identity axioms. Let N˜ :
S12 → U˜ be the interpretation based on τ˜ .
We define a parameter-free interpretation K : U˜ →
(U  EQ) by letting τK restricted to U be the trans-
lation corresponding to in0. We take α˜τK (v) := αN  (v),
δ˜τK (u, v) := δN  (u, v), SτK (uv) := SN  (u, v), etcetera. It
is easy to see that tauK indeed supports the promised inter-
pretation K .
It is easy to see that the following diagram commutes in
INT0.
S12





Clearly, U˜ is a sequential theory. So, we have the strong
Pudlák property for N˜ . Thus, we have a parameter-free N0 :
S12 → U˜ with N0  N˜ .
We find that K ◦ N0 is parameter-free and (K ◦ N0) 
(K ◦ N˜ ). On the other hand, K ◦ N˜ is equal in the sense of
INT0 to N . Ergo, (K ◦ N0)  N . Since N  is i-isomorphic
to N , we find (K ◦ N0)  N . unionsq
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